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Abstract—This paper studies the problem of secure commu-
nication over the two-receiver discrete memoryless broadcast
channel with one-sided receiver side information and with a
passive eavesdropper. We proposed a coding scheme which
is based upon the superposition-Marton framework. Secrecy
techniques such as the one-time pad, Carleial-Hellman secrecy
coding and Wyner secrecy coding are applied to ensure individual
secrecy. This scheme is shown to be capacity achieving for some
cases of the degraded broadcast channel. We also notice that
one-sided receiver side information provides the advantage of
rate region improvement, in particular when it is available at
the weaker legitimate receiver.
Index Terms—Broadcast channel, individual secrecy, physical
layer security, receiver side information.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
Broadcast channels model typical downlinks in communi-
cation systems, where a transmitter broadcasts independent
messages to multiple receivers. Similar to other wireless com-
munication channels, the open nature of broadcast channels
make them susceptible to passive eavesdroppers present in the
communication range. Due to the widespread application of
broadcast channels in communication systems, it is crucial to
ensure secure communication over broadcast channels.
The problem of secure broadcast channel has been studied
by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [1], Chia and El Gamal [2] as well as
Schaefer and Boche [3]. These works [1]–[3] studied cases of
two- or three-receiver broadcast channel in which a common
message is transmitted to all receivers and a private message is
protected from a certain number of receivers. Similarly, Chen,
Koyluoglu and Sezgin investigated the problem of secure two-
receiver broadcast channel but it involves the protection of two
private messages from an eavesdropper [4].
The works discussed above were also extended to account
for the availability of complementary receiver side informa-
tion at the legitimate receivers which is unknown to the
eavesdropper. The availability of complementary receiver side
information implies that each receiver knows a priori the
message they need not decode and it is shown to help in
improving the secrecy rate region [5]–[7].
However, when the available receiver side information is
non-complementary, i.e., receiver side information is missing
on certain number of receivers, it is generally unknown if the
advantage of secrecy rate region improvement still holds. This
motivates us to study the effect of non-complementary receiver
side information on secure broadcast channel by considering
the two-receiver discrete memoryless broadcast channel with
one-sided receiver side information and with an eavesdropper.
We will also be considering the individual secrecy notion
which requires the individual information leakage from each
message to the eavesdropper to be vanishing [4], [6]–[8].
In short, this paper aims to gain insights on the advantages
of non-complementary receiver side information on secure
broadcasting by proposing a secrecy scheme and deriving the
individual secrecy rate region for the two-receiver discrete
memoryless broadcast channel with one-sided receiver side
information and with a passive eavesdropper.
B. Contributions
Existing works on secure broadcast channel consider only
symmetrical receiver side information setup, i.e., receiver side
information is either absent [1]–[4] or present at both receivers
[5]–[7], [9]. The usage of the coding schemes in these works
for the non-complementary receiver side information setting in
this paper poses some limitations. More precisely, schemes for
the former case are suboptimal since they ignore the availabity
of receiver side information, whereas schemes for the latter
case cannot be applied if receiver side information is absent
at at least one receiver. As a result, we propose a technique to
deal with this asymmetrical receiver side information setting.
Using the proposed coding scheme, we derive a general inner
bound for the two-receiver discrete memoryless broadcast
channel with one-sided receiver side information and with
a passive eavesdropper under individual secrecy constraints.
We show that this inner bound establishes the individual
secrecy capacity region for the physically degraded deter-
ministic broadcast channel under all permutations of channel
degradedness. Through the capacity region results, we observe
that the advantage of one-sided receiver side information
manifests itself when it is available at the statistically weaker
receiver, providing gains in the capacity rate region.
C. Paper Organization
The entire paper will be organized as follows. Section II will
focus on the system model. Section III will provide the main
results on the coding scheme simplification. Next, section IV
will present some capacity region results. Lastly, Section V
will conclude the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we will denote random variables by up-
percase letters, their corresponding realizations by lowercase
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Fig. 1. The two-receiver broadcast channel with one-sided receiver side
information in the presence of an eavesdropper.
letters and their corresponding sets by calligraphic letters. A
(j − i+ 1)-sequence of random variables will be denoted by
Xji = (Xi, . . . , Xj) for 1 ≤ i ≤ j. Whenever i = 1, the
subscript will be dropped, resulting in Xj = (X1, . . . , Xj).
Rd represents the d-dimensional real Euclidean space and
Rd+ represents the d-dimensional non-negative real Euclidean
space. R will be used to represent a subset of Rd. T n
represents the set of jointly -typical n-sequences. Meanwhile,
[a : b] refers to a set of natural numbers between and including
a and b, for a ≤ b. Lastly, the operator × denotes the Cartesian
product.
The paper focuses on devising a coding scheme for the two-
receiver discrete memoryless broadcast channel with one-sided
receiver side information and with a passive eavesdropper
(hereafter referred as the broadcast channel with one-sided
receiver side information). The system model for this case is
illustrated in Fig. 1. In this model, we define (M1,M2) as the
source messages, Mi as the message requested by legitimate
receiver i, for all i ∈ {1, 2}. Let X denote the channel input
from the sender, while Yi and Z denote the channel output
to receiver i and the eavesdropper respectively. In n channel
uses, Xn represents the transmitted codeword, Y ni represents
the signal received by legitimate receiver i and Zn represents
the signal received by the eavesdropper. The memoryless (and
without feedback) nature of the channel also implies that
p(yn1 , y
n
2 , z
n|xn) =
n∏
i=1
p(y1i, y2i, zi|xi). (1)
In this case, the transmitter will be sending messages M1
and M2 to legitimate receiver 1 and 2, respectively through
the channel p(y1, y2, z|x). Besides, only one of the legitimate
receivers will be having the message they do not need to
decode as receiver side information to aid them in decoding
the transmitted messages. For our discussion, we will work
with the case in which receiver 1 knows M2 a priori.
Definition 1: A (2nR1 , 2nR2 , n) secrecy code for the two-
receiver discrete memoryless broadcast channel with one-sided
receiver side information consists of:
• two message sets, where M1 = [1 : 2nR1 ] and M2 =
[1 : 2nR2 ];
• an encoding function, f : M1 ×M2 → Xn, such that
Xn = f(M1,M2); and
• two decoding functions, where g1 : Yn1 ×M2 → M1,
such that Mˆ1 = g1(Y n1 ,M2) at receiver 1 and g2 : Yn2 →
M2, such that Mˆ2 = g2(Y n2 ) at receiver 2.
Both messages, M1 and M2 are assumed to be uniformly
distributed over their respective message set. Hence, we have
Ri =
1
nH(Mi), for all i ∈ {1, 2}. Meanwhile the individual
information leakage rate associated with the (2nR1 , 2nR2 , n)
secrecy code is defined as R(n)L,i =
1
nI(Mi;Z
n), for all i ∈
{1, 2}.
The probability of error for the secrecy code at each receiver
i is defined as P (n)e,i = P{Mˆi 6= Mi}, for i ∈ {1, 2}. A rate
pair (R1, R2) is said to be achievable if there exists a sequence
of (2nR1 , 2nR2 , n) codes such that
P
(n)
e,i ≤ n, for all i ∈ {1, 2} (2)
R
(n)
L,i ≤ τn, for all i ∈ {1, 2} (3)
lim
n→∞ n = 0 and limn→∞ τn = 0 (4)
III. CODING SCHEME FOR BROADCAST CHANNEL WITH
ONE-SIDED RECEIVER SIDE INFORMATION
Our coding scheme is constructed by having the
superposition-Marton coding scheme [10], [11] as a basic
framework. The message segments encoded at each layer of
the scheme is then protected using secrecy techniques such as
the one-time pad [12], Carleial-Hellman secrecy coding [13]
and Wyner serecy coding [14].
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Fig. 2. Proposed coding scheme for the two-receiver broadcast channel with one-sided receiver side information and with an eavesdropper.
As illustrated in Fig. 2a, this coding scheme involves
splitting Mi, for all i ∈ {1, 2}, into three independent message
segments, namely Mia at rate Ria, Mib at rate Rib and Mic at
rate Ric, i.e., Mi = (Mia,Mib,Mic) where Mia ∈ [1 : 2nRia ],
Mib ∈ [1 : 2nRib ], Mic ∈ [1 : 2nRic ] and Ri = Ria+Rib+Ric.
Exploiting the availability of receiver side information at
receiver 1, we will be XOR-ing the first segment of each mes-
sage to form a one-time pad signal which ensures individual
secrecy. The one-time pad signal Ma has a rate of Ra and
Ma = M1a⊕M2a where Ma ∈ [1 : 2nRa ]. This XOR-ing pro-
cess gives us another rate relation Ra = R1a = R2a. Note that
since receiver 2 does not have any receiver side information,
it is unable to retrieve M2a even though Ma is successfully
decoded. As a result, we introduce a new approach of further
splitting M2a into M2a1 at rate R2a1 and M2a2 at rate R2a2,
i.e., M2a = (M2a1,M2a2) where M2a1 ∈ [1 : 2nR2a1 ],
M2a2 ∈ [1 : 2nR2a2 ] and R2a = R2a1+R2a2. M2a1 and M2a2
will be transmitted to receiver 2 through different codeword
layers, allowing M2a to be fully recovered.
These message segments then make up the coding scheme in
Fig. 2b which comprises of four layers: cloud center codeword
Un, common satellite codeword V n as well as private satellite
codewords V n1 and V
n
2 . The cloud center codeword U
n holds
the one-time pad signal M1a⊕M2a, i.e., Ma. Upon decoding
the one-time pad signal, receiver 1 can unveil the intended
message segment M1a using its receiver side information M2.
Next, a common satellite codeword V n is formed and
combined with Un using superposition coding [10]. In the
V n codeword layer, Carleial-Hellman secrecy coding [13]
and Wyner serecy coding [14] is implemented simultaneously
to protect the message segments M1b, M2b and M2a1. The
implementation of Wyner serecy coding is apparent since a
randomly generated D is used to protect M1b, M2b and M2a1.
Carleial-Hellman secrecy coding is applied since it allows each
of the message segments M1b and M2b to act as additional
randomness in protecting each another and M2a1. This helps
reduce the size of randomness D and subsequently increases
the size of M1b and M2b which bear useful information.
The private satellite codewords V n1 and V
n
2 are responsible
of carrying the remaining message segments to their respective
legitimate receivers. In our case, V n1 carries M1c to receiver
1, whereas V n2 carries M2a2 and M2c to receiver 2. Both
V n1 and V
n
2 are also secured with Wyner secrecy coding
[14] using randomly generated D1 and D2 respectively. The
private satellite codewords V n1 and V
n
2 are first combined
under Marton coding in which the components L1 and L2 are
present to ensure the existence of at least one jointly typical
sequence pair between V n1 and V
n
2 [11]. Note that L1 and L2
do not play a role in message protection since they cannot
be preselected [15]. The V n1 and V
n
2 codeword layers are
then combined with the upper Un and V n codeword layers
using superposition coding, completing the construction of our
coding scheme. This coding scheme achieves the individual
secrecy rate region R in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: The following individual secrecy rate region is
achievable for the two-receiver discrete memoryless broadcast
channel with one-sided receiver side information and with a
passive eavesdropper:
R ,

(R1, R2)
∈ R2+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
R1 < I(V1;Y1|V )− I(V1;Z|V )
+ I(V ;Y2|U)− I(V ;Z|U) +RN1 +RN2,
R1 < I(U, V, V1;Y 1)− I(V1;Z|V ) +RN3,
R1 −R2 < I(V, V1;Y1|U)
− I(V, V1;Z|U) +RN3,
R2 < I(V, V2;Y2|U)− I(V, V2;Z|U)
+ min{RN2 +RN4, 0},
R1 +R2 < I(U, V, V2;Y2)
− I(V, V2;Z|U) +RN4 +RN5
over all p(u)p(v|u)p(v1, v2|v)p(x|v1, v2)
subject to
I(V, V1;Y1|U) +RN3 > I(V, V1;Z|U),
I(V1;Y1|V ) +RN3 > I(V1;Z|V ), and
I(V2;Y2|V ) > I(V2;Z|V ).

(5)
where RN1 = I(V2;Y2|V ) − I(V2;Z|V ) − I(V1;V2|V ),
RN2 = min{I(V ;Y1|U) − I(V ;Z|U), 0}, RN3 =
min{RN1, 0}, RN4 = I(V1;Y1|V ) − I(V1;Z|V ) −
I(V1;V2|V ) and RN5 = min{I(V ;Y1|U) + I(U ;Y1) −
I(U ;Y2), I(V ;Y1|U), I(V ;Z|U)}.
Proof of Theorem 1: Refer to Appendix B for the
complete achievability proof.
IV. CAPACITY REGION IN SOME SPECIAL CASES
In this section, we will show that our scheme is opti-
mal in achieving the individual secrecy capacity region for
some special cases of the physically degraded discrete mem-
oryless broadcast channel defined as p(y1, y2, . . . , yk|x) =
p(y1|x)p(y2|y1) · · · p(yk|yk−1), i.e., X → Y1 → Y2 → . . .→
Yk forms a Markov chain.
More specifically, the individual secrecy capacity region for
the physically degraded deterministic broadcast channel under
all permutations of channel degradedness among Y1, Y2 and Z
is proven in the following theorems. In Theorem 2, the receiver
with receiver side information is the weaker one, whereas in
Theorem 3, the receiver with receiver side information is the
stronger one.
Theorem 2: For the two-receiver discrete memoryless broad-
cast channel with one-sided receiver side information and with
a passive eavesdropper such that
1) Y1, Y2 and Z are deterministic functions of X; and
2) X → Y2 → Y1 → Z, or
X → Y2 → Z → Y1, or
X → Z → Y2 → Y1,
the individual secrecy capacity region is given by
R1 ,

(R1, R2)
∈ R2+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
R1 ≤ min{H(Y1), H(Y2|Z),
H(Y1|Z) +R2},
R2 ≤ H(Y2|Z),
R1 +R2 ≤ H(Y2)
over all p(x).

. (6)
Proof of Theorem 2: We present the achievability proof
in the following, and the converse proof in Appendix B. The
region R1 can be achieved by taking the union of the regions:
R1a, R1b, R1c and R1d stated below.
1) For all p(x) such that H(Y2) > H(Y1) > H(Z)
The individual secrecy rate region in this case can be
achieved using Theorem 1 by setting U = φ, V1 = V = Y1
and V2 = Y2. This reduces the proposed scheme to a
two-layer superposition coding scheme in which V n and
V n2 need to be decoded. As a result, from the proposed
coding scheme in Fig. 2b, we remove Ma, M1a, M2a,
M2a1, M2a2, M1c, D1, L1 and L2. Upon removing the
corresponding rate terms and constraints, we apply the
Fourier-Motzkin procedure to obtain the region R1a as
follows:
(R1, R2)
∈ R2+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
R1 < min{H(Y1), H(Y2|Z),
H(Y1|Z) +R2},
R2 < H(Y2|Z),
R1 +R2 < H(Y2)
over all p(x) subject to
H(Y1|Z) > 0 and H(Y2|Y1) > 0.

. (7)
2) For all p(x) such that H(Y2) = H(Y1) > H(Z)
In order to achieve the individual secrecy rate region in
this case, from Theorem 1, we set U = φ and V1 = V2 =
V = Y1 = Y2. This reduces the proposed scheme to a
single V n codeword layer. Thus, from the proposed coding
scheme in Fig. 2b, we are left with M1b, M2b and D. Upon
removing the corresponding rate terms and constraints, we
apply the Fourier-Motzkin procedure to obtain the region
R1b as follows:
(R1, R2)
∈ R2+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
R1 < H(Y2|Z),
R2 < H(Y2|Z),
R1 +R2 < H(Y2)
over all p(x) subject to
H(Y1|Z) > 0.

. (8)
3) For all p(x) such that H(Y2) > H(Z) ≥ H(Y1)
When the eavesdropper is of equal channel strength as
the weaker legitimate receiver 1, from Theorem 1, we
need to set V1 = V = U = Y1 and V2 = Y2. This
reduces the proposed scheme to a two-layer superposition
coding scheme with the Un and V n2 codewords. Thus, from
the proposed coding scheme in Fig. 2b, we remove M1b,
M2a1, M2b, M1c, D, D1, L1 and L2. Upon removing
the corresponding rate terms and constraints, we apply
the Fourier-Motzkin procedure to obtain the region R1c
as follows:
(R1, R2)
∈ R2+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
R1 < min{H(Y1), R2},
R2 < H(Y2|Z),
R1 +R2 < H(Y2)
over all p(x).
 . (9)
4) For all p(x) such that H(Z) ≥ H(Y2) ≥ H(Y1)
When the eavesdropper is not weaker than both legitimate
receivers, from Theorem 1, we need to set V1 = V2 = V =
U = φ. This essentially means that secure communication
is not possible and we obtain the region R1d = {(0, 0)}.
By taking the union of R1a, R1b, R1c and R1d, we achieve
the individual secrecy capacity region (6).
Remark 1: Referring to the individual secrecy capacity
region for the two-receiver discrete memoryless broadcast
channel without receiver side information and with a passive
eavesdropper [4, Theorem 3], we flip the order of channel de-
gradedness between Y1 and Y2, and set Y1 to be a deterministic
function of X . Comparing that with our results in Theorem 2
shows that the availability of receiver side information at
receiver 1, in particular, the weaker legitimate receiver, allows
us to achieve a larger individual secrecy rate region.
Remark 2: It is also interesting to note that while using the
superposition-Marton coding scheme [10], [11], the inclusion
of one-time pad signal, a network coding solution, can help
establish a secure communication when the eavesdropper is
stronger than the weaker legitimate receiver. This can be
observed from the achievability proof of R1c. However, when
the eavesdropper is not weaker than both legitimate receivers,
secure communication is not possible.
Theorem 3: For the two-receiver discrete memoryless broad-
cast channel with one-sided receiver side information and with
a passive eavesdropper such that
1) Y1, Y2 and Z are deterministic functions of X; and
2) X → Y1 → Y2 → Z, or
X → Y1 → Z → Y2, or
X → Z → Y1 → Y2,
the individual secrecy capacity region is given by
R2 ,

(R1, R2)
∈ R2+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
R1 ≤ H(Y1|Z),
R2 ≤ H(Y2|Z),
R1 +R2 ≤ H(Y1)
over all p(x).
 . (10)
Proof of Theorem 3: We present the achievability proof
in the following, and the converse proof in Appendix C. The
region R2 can be achieved by taking the union of the regions:
R2a, R2b, R2c and R2d stated below.
1) For all p(x) such that H(Y1) > H(Y2) > H(Z)
The individual secrecy rate region in this case can be
achieved using Theorem 1 by setting U = φ, V1 = Y1
and V2 = V = Y2. As a result, we have a superposition
coding scheme with only the V n and V n1 codeword layers.
From the proposed coding scheme in Fig. 2b, we remove
Ma, M1a, M2a, M2a1, M2a2, M2c D2, L1 and L2. Upon
removing the corresponding rate terms and constraints, we
apply the Fourier-Motzkin procedure to obtain the region
R2a as follows:
(R1, R2)
∈ R2+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
R1 < H(Y1|Z),
R2 < H(Y2|Z),
R1 +R2 < H(Y1)
over all p(x) subject to
H(Y1|Z) > 0 and H(Y1|Y2) > 0.

. (11)
2) For all p(x) such that H(Y1) = H(Y2) > H(Z)
In order to achieve the individual secrecy rate region in
this case, from Theorem 1, we set U = φ and V2 =
V1 = V = Y2 = Y1. The proposed scheme reduces to
the V n codeword layer. Thus, from the proposed coding
scheme in Fig. 2b, we are left with M1b, M2b and D. Upon
removing the corresponding rate terms and constraints, we
apply the Fourier-Motzkin procedure to obtain the region
R2b as follows:
(R1, R2)
∈ R2+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
R1 < H(Y1|Z),
R2 < H(Y2|Z),
R1 +R2 < H(Y1)
over all p(x) subject to
H(Y2|Z) > 0.

. (12)
3) For all p(x) such that H(Y1) > H(Z) ≥ H(Y2)
For the case in which the eavesdropper is of equal channel
strength as the weaker legitimate receiver 2, from Theo-
rem 1, we set V1 = Y1 and V2 = V = U = φ. We
are essentially disregarding the weaker legitimate receiver
2 and the proposed scheme reduces to the simple wiretap
channel coding scheme with only V n1 . Thus, the proposed
coding scheme in Fig. 2b is reduced to only having M1c
and D1. Upon removing the corresponding rate terms and
constraints, we apply the Fourier-Motzkin procedure to
obtain the region R2c as follows: (R1, R2)∈ R2+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
R1 < H(Y1|Z),
R2 = 0
over all p(x).
 . (13)
4) For all p(x) such that H(Z) ≥ H(Y1) ≥ H(Y2)
When the eavesdropper is not weaker than both legitimate
receivers, from Theorem 1, we need to set V1 = V2 = V =
U = φ. This again indicates that secure communication is
not possible and we obtain the region R1d = {(0, 0)}.
By taking the union of R2a,R2b, R2c and R2d, we achieve the
individual secrecy capacity region of the channel in interest.
Remark 3: Revisiting the individual secrecy capacity region
for the two-receiver discrete memoryless broadcast channel
without receiver side information and with a passive eaves-
dropper under similar channel degradedness [4, Theorem 3],
we set Y1 to be a deterministic function of X . From here, we
realize that single-sided receiver side information is not useful
in physically degraded deterministic broadcast channel when it
is available at receiver 1, which is now the stronger legitimate
receiver. The availability of receiver side information does
not help in improving the individual secrecy rate region.
As a result, when single-sided receiver side information is
available at the stronger legitimate receiver, our proposed
coding scheme in Fig. 2b can also be simplified by removing
the Un codeword, consequently removing Ma, M1a, M2a,
M2a1 and M2a2.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we studied the case of the two-receiver
discrete memoryless broadcast channel with one-sided receiver
side information and with a passive eavesdropper. Under
the context of individual secrecy, we presented a coding
scheme constructed from a combination of superposition-
Marton coding scheme [10], [11] and secrecy techniques such
as the one-time pad [12], Carleial-Hellman secrecy coding
[13] as well as Wyner serecy coding [14]. This scheme is
shown to be capacity achieving for some special cases of the
physically degraded deterministic broadcast channel. In these
cases, we observe that the availability of one-sided receiver
side information at the weaker legitimate receiver provides
rate region improvements. However, when one-sided receiver
side information is available at the stronger legitimate receiver,
no gains are obtained since their statistical strength allows
full recovery of the intended message. Finally, we note that
the implementation of joint secrecy and the derivation of the
converse for the broadcast channel with one-sided receiver side
information will be covered in future works.
APPENDIX A
In this section, we will present the achievability proof of
Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1: Rate splitting. This coding scheme
involves splitting Mi, for all i ∈ {1, 2}, into three indepedent
message segments, namely Mia at rate Ria, Mib at rate Rib
and Mic at rate Ric, i.e., Mi = (Mia,Mib,Mic) where Mia ∈
[1 : 2nRia ], Mib ∈ [1 : 2nRb ] and Mic ∈ [1 : 2nRic ]. and
Ri = Ra + Rb + Ric. This rate splitting imposes the rate
relations:
R1 =R1a +R1b +R1c, (14)
R2 =R2a +R2b +R2c. (15)
A one-time pad Ma at rate Ra is constructed using the
message segments M1a and M2a, i.e., Ma = M1a ⊕ M2a,
where Ma ∈ [1 : 2nRa ]. This gives the following rate relation:
Ra = R1a = R2a. (16)
We will further split the message segment M2a into M2a1 at
rate R2a1 and M2a2 at rate R2a2, where M2a1 ∈ [1 : 2nR2a1 ],
M2a2 ∈ [1 : 2nR2a2 ]. Both M2a1 and M2a2 will be inserted
into different codeword layers. This gives the following rate
relation:
R2a = R2a1 +R2a2. (17)
Codebook generation. Fix a pmf
p(u)p(v|u)p(v1, v2|v)p(x|v1, v2). Randomly and
E0 : (Un(1), V n(1, 1, 1, 1, d′), V n1 (1, 1, 1, 1, d′, 1, d′1, l1), V n2 (1, 1, 1, 1, d′, 1, 1, d′2, l2)) /∈ T n′ for all l2 and l2, (18)
E11 : (Un(1), V n(1, 1, 1, 1, d′), V n1 (1, 1, 1, 1, d′, 1, d′1, l′1), Y n1 ) /∈ T n (19)
E12 : (Un(1), V n(1, 1, 1, 1, d′), V n1 (1, 1, 1, 1, d′,m1c, d1, l1), Y n1 ) ∈ T n for some m1c 6= 1, d1 and l1, (20)
E13 : (Un(1), V n(1,m1b, 1, 1, d), V n1 (1,m1b, 1, 1, d,m1c, d1, l1), Y n1 ) ∈ T n for some m1b 6= 1, d,m1c, d1 and l1, (21)
E14 : (Un(ma), V n(ma,m1b, 1, 1, d), V n1 (ma,m1b, 1, 1, d,m1c, d1, l1), Y n1 ) ∈ T n (22)
for some ma 6= 1,m1b, d,m1c, d1 and l1,
E21 : (Un(1), V n(1, 1, 1, 1, d′), V n2 (1, 1, 1, 1, d′, 1, 1, d′2, l′2), Y n2 ) /∈ T n (23)
E22 : (Un(1), V n(1, 1, 1, 1, d′), V n2 (1, 1, 1, 1, d′,m2a2,m2c, d2, l2), Y n2 ) ∈ T n (24)
for some (m2a2,m2c) 6= (1, 1), d2 and l2,
E23 : (Un(1), V n(1,m1b,m2b,m2a1, d), V n2 (1,m1b,m2b,m2a1, d,m2a2,m2c, d2, l2), Y n2 ) ∈ T n (25)
for some (m2b,m2a1) 6= (1, 1),m1b, d,m2a2,m2c, d2 and l2,
E24 : (Un(ma), V n(ma,m1b,m2b,m2a1, d), V n2 (ma,m1b,m2b,m2a1, d,m2a2,m2c, d2, l2), Y n2 ) ∈ T n (26)
for some ma 6= 1,m1b,m2b,m2a1, d,m2a2,m2c, d2 and l2.
independently generate 2nRa sequences un(ma), where
ma = m1a ⊕ m2a, ma ∈ [1 : 2nRa ], each according to∏n
i=1 pU (ui).
For each ma, randomly and conditionally
independently generate 2n[R1b+R2b+R2a1+Rd] sequences
vn(ma,m1b,m2b,m2a1, d), (m1b,m2b,m2a1, d) ∈ [1 :
2nR1b ]× [1 : 2nR2b ]× [1 : 2nR2a1 ]× [1 : 2nRd ], each according
to
∏n
i=1 pV |U (vi|ui(ma)).
For each (ma,m1b,m2b,m2a1, d), randomly and condi-
tionally independently generate 2n[R1c+Rd1+Rl1] sequences
vn1 (ma,m1b,m2b,m2a1, d,m1c, d1, l1), (m1c, d1, l1) ∈ [1 :
2nR1c ] × [1 : 2nRd1 ] × [1 : 2nRl1 ], each according to∏n
i=1 pV1|V (v1i|vi(ma,m1b,m2b,m2a1, d)).
Similarly, for each (ma,m1b,m2b,m2a1, d), randomly and
conditionally independently generate 2n[R2a2+R2c+Rd2+Rl2]
sequences vn2 (ma,m1b,m2b,m2a1, d,m2a2,m2c, d2, l2),
(m2a2,m2c, d2, l2) ∈ [1 : 2nR2a2 ] × [1 : 2nR2c ] ×
[1 : 2nRd2 ] × [1 : 2nRl2 ], each according to∏n
i=1 pV2|V (v2i|vi(ma,m1b,m2b,m2a1, d)). This codebook
is revealed to all parties (including the eavesdropper).
Encoding. To send (m1,m2), the encoder chooses un(ma),
where ma , m1a ⊕m2a. Given un(ma), the encoder inde-
pendently generates d with equal probability over [1 : 2nRd ]
and find vn(ma,m1b,m2b,m2a1, d).
Given vn(ma,m1b,m2b,m2a1, d), the encoder indepen-
dently generates d1 and d2 with equal probability over [1 :
2nRd1 ] and [1 : 2nRd2 ] respectively before finding an index
pair (l1, l2) such that (vn1 (·, l1), vn2 (·, l2)) ∈ T n′ . If there is
more than one such pair, the encoder chooses an arbitrary one
among those. If no such pair exists, choose (l1, l2) = (1, 1).
Lastly, given the chosen jointly typical pair (vn1 , v
n
2 ),
it then randomly generates the codeword Xn(m1,m2) ∼∏n
i=1 pX|V1,V2(xi|v1i(·), v2i(·)) and transmits it.
Decoding. Let  > ′. Receiver 1 declares that
(mˆa, mˆ1b, mˆ1c) is sent if it is the unique tuple such
that (un(·), vn(·, d), vn1 (·, d, ·, d1, l1), yn1 ) ∈ T n for some
(d, d1, l1); otherwise it declares an error. Since receiver 1
knows M2 as receiver message side informaiton, it decodes
(un, vn, vn1 ) over a set of 2
n(Ra+R1b+Rd+R1c+Rd1+Rl1) can-
didates.
On the other hand, receiver 2 declares that
(mˆa, mˆ2b, mˆ2a1, mˆ2a2, mˆ2c) is sent if it is the unique tuple
such that (un(·), vn(·,m1b, d), vn2 (·,m1b, d, ·, d2, l2), yn2 ) ∈
T n for some (m1b, d, d2, l2); otherwise it declares an error.
In contrast to receiver 1, receiver 2 does not have receiver
message side informaiton and it decodes (un, vn, vn2 ) over all
2n(Ra+R1b+R2b+Rd+R2a+R2c+Rd2+Rl2) candidates.
Analysis of the probability of error. Assume without loss
of generality that the transmitted messages are equal to one
and (d, d1, d2, l1, l2) = (d′, d′1, d
′
2, l
′
1, l
′
2). Receiver 1 makes an
error only if one or more of the error events (18)–(22) occur.
On the other hand, receiver 2 makes an error only if one or
more of the error events (18), (23)–(26) occur.
Considering the error events, we apply the mutual covering
lemma and the packing lemma to obtain the achievability
conditions:
Rl1 +Rl2 > I(V1;V2|U, V ), (27)
R1 +Rd +Rd1 +Rl1 < I(U, V, V1;Y1), (28)
R1 −Ra +Rd +Rd1 +Rl1 < I(V, V1;Y1|U), (29)
R1c +Rd1 +Rl1 < I(V1;Y1|U, V ), (30)
R2 +R1b +Rd +R2a
+Rd2 +Rl2 < I(U, V, V2;Y2), (31)
R2 −Ra +R1b +Rd +R2a
+Rd2 +Rl2 < I(V, V2;Y2|U), (32)
R2a2 +R2c +Rd2 +Rl2 < I(V2;Y2|U, V ). (33)
Analysis of individual secrecy. In order to ensure the
individual secrecy of both messages, we need to satisfy
R
(n)
L,i ≤ τn, for all i ∈ {1, 2} as stated in (3). Here, we show
that I(M1;Zn) ≤ nτn and I(M2;Zn) ≤ nτn, or alternatively
I(M1;Z
n) + I(M2;Z
n) ≤ 2nτn.
For the individual secrecy of M1, we have
I(M1;Z
n)
= I(M1a,M1b,M1c;Z
n)
= I(M1a;Z
n) + I(M1b,M1c;Z
n|M1a)
= I(M1a;Z
n) +H(M1b,M1c|M1a)−H(M1b,M1c|Zn,M1a)
= n[R1b +R1c] + I(M1a;Z
n)−H(M1b,M1c|Zn,M1a)
≤ n[R1b +R1c] + I(M1a;Ma, Zn)−H(M1b,M1c|Zn,M1a)
= n[R1b +R1c] + I(M1a;Z
n|Ma)−H(M1b,M1c|Zn,M1a)
≤ n[R1b +R1c] + I(M1a,M2a;Zn|Ma)−H(M1b,M1c|Zn,M1a)
= n[R1b +R1c] + I(M2a;Z
n|Ma)−H(M1b,M1c|Zn,M1a)
= n[R1b +R1c] +H(M2a|Ma)−H(M2a|Zn,Ma)
−H(M1b,M1c|Zn,M1a)
= n[R1b +R1c +R2a]−H(M2a|Zn,Ma)
−H(M1b,M1c|Zn,M1a)
≤ n[R1b +R1c +R2a]−H(M2a|Zn,Ma)
−H(M1b,M1c|Zn,Ma,M1a)
= n[R1b +R1c +R2a]−H(M2a|Zn,Ma)
−H(M1b,M1c|Zn,Ma)
= n[R1b +R1c +R2a]−H(M2a1,M2a2|Zn,Ma)
−H(M1b,M1c|Zn,Ma)
= n[R1b +R1c +R2a]
−H(M1b,M2b,M2a1, D,M2a2,M2c, D2|Zn,Ma)
+H(M1b,M2b, D,M2c, D2|Zn,Ma,M2a1,M2a2)
−H(M1b,M2b, D,M1c, D1|Zn,Ma)
+H(M2b, D,D1|Zn,Ma,M1b,M1c)
= n[R1b +R1c +R2a]
−H(M1b,M2b,M2a1, D|Zn,Ma)
−H(M2a2,M2c, D2|Zn,Ma,M1b,M2b,M2a1, D)
+H(M1b,M2b, D|Zn,Ma,M2a1,M2a2)
+H(M2c, D2|Zn,Ma,M2a1,M2a2,M1b,M2b, D)
−H(M1b,M2b, D|Zn,Ma)
−H(M1c, D1|Zn,Ma,M1b,M2b, D)
+H(M2b, D|Zn,Ma,M1b,M1c)
+H(D1|Zn,Ma,M1b,M1c,M2b, D)
≤ n[R1b +R1c +R2a]
−H(M1b,M2b,M2a1, D|Zn,Ma)
−H(M2a2,M2c, D2|Zn,Ma,M1b,M2b,M2a1, D)
+H(M1b,M2b, D|Zn,Ma,M2a1)
+H(M2c, D2|Zn,Ma,M1b,M2b,M2a1, D,M2a2)
−H(M1b,M2b, D|Zn,Ma)
−H(M1c, D1|Zn,Ma,M1b,M2b, D)
+H(M2b, D|Zn,Ma,M1b)
+H(D1|Zn,Ma,M1b,M2b, D,M1c) (34)
We establish a lower bound on the equivocation term
H(M1b,M2b, D|Zn,Ma) in (34).
H(M1b,M2b, D|Zn,Ma)
= H(M1b,M2b, D|Ma)− I(M1b,M2b, D;Zn|Ma)
= H(M1b,M2b, D)− I(M1b,M2b, D;Zn|Ma)
= n[R1b +R2b +Rd]− I(M1b,M2b, D;Zn|Ma)
= n[R1b +R2b +Rd]− I(V n,M1b,M2b, D;Zn|Un,Ma)
(a)
= n[R1b +R2b +Rd]− I(V n;Zn|Un)
(b)
≥ n[R1b +R2b +Rd]− nI(V ;Z|U)− nδ1(τ) (35)
where (a) follows since Ma → Un → Zn and
(M1b,M2b, D) → V n → Zn form Markov chains and (b)
follows since I(V n;Zn|Un) ≤ nI(V ;Z|U) + nδ1(τ) as in
[16, Lemma 3].
We establish a lower bound on the equivocation term
H(M1c, D1|Zn,Ma,M1b,M2b, D) in (34).
H(M1c, D1|Zn,Ma,M1b,M2b, D)
= H(M1c, D1|Ma,M1b,M2b, D)
− I(M1c, D1;Zn|Ma,M1b,M2b, D)
= H(M1c, D1)− I(M1c, D1;Zn|Ma,M1b,M2b, D)
= n[R1c +Rd1]− I(M1c, D1;Zn|Ma,M1b,M2b, D)
= n[R1c +Rd1]
− I(V n1 ,M1c, D1;Zn|Un,Ma, V n,M1b,M2b, D)
(c)
= n[R1c +Rd1]− I(V n1 ;Zn|Un, V n)
≥ n[R1c +Rd1]− nI(V1;Z|U, V )− nδ2(τ) (36)
where (c) follows since Ma → Un → Zn, (M1b,M2b, D)→
V n → Zn and (M1c, D1) → (V n, V n1 ) → Zn form Markov
chains. The third Markov chain can be proven using the
functional dependence graph [17, Definition A.1] and the fact
that V n can be retrieved by knowing V n1 .
We establish a lower bound on the equivocation term
H(M1b,M2b,M2a1, D|Zn,Ma) in (34).
H(M1b,M2b,M2a1, D|Zn,Ma)
= H(M1b,M2b,M2a1, D|Ma)− I(M1b,M2b,M2a1, D;Zn|Ma)
= H(M1b,M2b,M2a1, D)− I(M1b,M2b,M2a1, D;Zn|Ma)
= n[R1b +R2b +R2a1 +Rd]− I(M1b,M2b,M2a1, D;Zn|Ma)
= n[R1b +R2b +R2a1 +Rd]
− I(V n,M1b,M2b,M2a1, D;Zn|Un,Ma)
(d)
= n[R1b +R2b +R2a1 +Rd]− I(V n;Zn|Un)
≥ n[R1b +R2b +R2a1 +Rd]− nI(V ;Z|U)− nδ3(τ)
(37)
where (d) follows since Ma → Un → Zn and
(M1b,M2b,M2a1, D)→ V n → Zn form Markov chains.
We establish a lower bound on the equivocation term
H(M2a2,M2c, D2|Zn,Ma,M1b,M2b,M2a1, D) in (34).
H(M2a2,M2c, D2|Zn,Ma,M1b,M2b,M2a1, D)
= H(M2a2,M2c, D2|Ma,M1b,M2b,M2a1, D)
− I(M2a2,M2c, D2;Zn|Ma,M1b,M2b,M2a1, D)
= H(M2a2,M2c, D2)
− I(M2a2,M2c, D2;Zn|Ma,M1b,M2b,M2a1, D)
= n[R2a2 +R2c +Rd2]
− I(M2a2,M2c, D2;Zn|Ma,M1b,M2b,M2a1, D)
= n[R2a2 +R2c +Rd2]− I(V n2 ,M2a2,M2c, D2;Zn|Un,
Ma, V
n,M1b,M2b,M2a1, D)
(e)
= n[R2a2 +R2c +Rd2]− I(V n2 ;Zn|Un, V n)
≥ n[R2a2 +R2c +Rd2]− nI(V2;Z|U, V )− nδ4(τ) (38)
where (e) follows since Ma → Un → Zn,
(M1b,M2b,M2a1, D) → V n → Zn and (M2a2,M2c, D2) →
(V n, V n2 ) → Zn form Markov chains. The third Markov
chain can be proven using the functional dependence graph
[17, Definition A.1] and the fact that V n can be retrieved by
knowing V n2 .
We establish an upper bound on the equivocation term
H(M2b, D|Zn,Ma,M1b) in (34). By [10, Lemma 22.1],
H(M2b, D|Zn,Ma,M1b)
≤ n[R2b +Rd − I(V ;Z|U)] + nδ5(τ) (39)
if
R2b +Rd ≥ I(V ;Z|U) (40)
We establish an upper bound on the equivocation term
H(D1|Zn,Ma,M1b,M2b, D,M1c) in (34). By [10, Lemma
22.1],
H(D1|Zn,Ma,M1b,M2b, D,M1c)
≤ n[Rd1 − I(V1;Z|U, V )] + nδ6(τ) (41)
if
Rd1 ≥ I(V1;Z|U, V ) (42)
We establish an upper bound on the equivocation term
H(M1b,M2b, D|Zn,Ma,M2a1) in (34). By [10, Lemma
22.1],
H(M1b,M2b, D|Zn,Ma,M2a1)
≤ n[R1b +R2b +Rd − I(V ;Z|U)] + nδ7(τ) (43)
if
R1b +R2b +Rd ≥ I(V ;Z|U) (44)
We establish an upper bound on the equivocation term
H(M2c, D2|Zn,Ma,M1b,M2b,M2a1, D,M2a2) in (34). By
[10, Lemma 22.1],
H(M2c, D2|Zn,Ma,M1b,M2b,M2a1, D,M2a2)
≤ n[R2c +Rd2 − I(V2;Z|U, V )] + nδ8(τ) (45)
if
R2c +Rd2 ≥ I(V2;Z|U, V ) (46)
For the individual secrecy of M2, we have
I(M2;Z
n)
= I(M2a1,M2a2,M2b,M2c;Z
n)
= H(M2a1,M2a2,M2b,M2c)
−H(M2a1,M2a2,M2b,M2c|Zn)
= n[R2a1 +R2a2 +R2b +R2c]
−H(M2a1,M2a2,M2b,M2c|Zn)
= n[R2a +R2b +R2c]
−H(Ma,M1b,M2b,M2a1,M2a2, D,M2c, D2|Zn)
+H(Ma,M1b, D,D2|Zn,M2a1,M2a2,M2b,M2c)
= n[R2a +R2b +R2c]
−H(Ma|Zn)−H(M1b,M2b,M2a1, D|Zn,Ma)
−H(M2a2,M2c, D2|Zn,Ma,M1b,M2b,M2a1, D)
+H(Ma|Zn,M2a1,M2a2,M2b,M2c)
+H(M1b, D|Zn,Ma,M2a1,M2a2,M2b,M2c)
+H(D2|Zn,Ma,M2a1,M2a2,M1b,M2b, D,M2c)
≤ n[R2a +R2b +R2c]−H(Ma|Zn) +H(Ma|Zn)
−H(M1b,M2b,M2a1, D|Zn,Ma)
−H(M2a2,M2c, D2|Zn,Ma,M1b,M2b,M2a1, D)
+H(M1b, D|Zn,Ma,M2a1,M2b)
+H(D2|Zn,Ma,M2a1,M2a2,M1b,M2b, D,M2c)
= n[R2a +R2b +R2c]−H(M1b,M2b,M2a1, D|Zn,Ma)
−H(M2a2,M2c, D2|Zn,Ma,M1b,M2b,M2a1, D)
+H(M1b, D|Zn,Ma,M2a1,M2b)
+H(D2|Zn,Ma,M2a1,M2a2,M1b,M2b, D,M2c) (47)
We establish a lower bound on the equivocation term
H(M1b,M2b,M2a1, D|Zn,Ma) in (47) and obtain the same
bound as in (37). Replacing δ3(τ) with δ9(τ), we have
H(M1b,M2b,M2a1, D|Zn,Ma)
≥ n[R1b +R2b +R2a1 +Rd]− nI(V ;Z|U)− nδ9(τ)
(48)
We establish a lower bound on the equivocation term
H(M2a2,M2c, D2|Zn,Ma,M1b,M2b,M2a1, D) in (47).
H(M2a2,M2c, D2|Zn,Ma,M1b,M2b,M2a1, D)
= H(M2a2,M2c, D2|Ma,M1b,M2b,M2a1, D)
− I(M2a2,M2c, D2;Zn|Ma,M1b,M2b,M2a1, D)
= H(M2a2,M2c, D2)
− I(M2a2,M2c, D2;Zn|Ma,M1b,M2b,M2a1, D)
= n[R2a2 +R2c +Rd2]
− I(M2a2,M2c, D2;Zn|Ma,M1b,M2b,M2a1, D)
= n[R2a2 +R2c +Rd2]− I(V n2 ,M2a2,M2c, D2;Zn|Un,
Ma, V
n,M1b,M2b,M2a1, D)
(f)
= n[R2a2 +R2c +Rd2]− I(V n2 ;Zn|Un, V n)
≥ n[R2a2 +R2c +Rd2]− nI(V2;Z|U, V )− nδ10(τ)
(49)
where (f) follows since Ma → Un → Zn,
(M1b,M2b,M2a1, D) → V n → Zn and (M2a2,M2c, D2) →
(V n, V n2 ) → Zn form Markov chains. The third Markov
chain can be proven using the functional dependence graph
[17, Definition A.1] and the fact that V n can be retrieved by
knowing V n2 .
We establish an upper bound on the equivocation term
H(M1b, D|Zn,Ma,M2a1,M2b) in (47). By [10, Lemma
22.1],
H(M1b, D|Zn,Ma,M2a1,M2b)
≤ n[R1b +Rd − I(V ;Z|U)] + nδ11(τ) (50)
if
R1b +Rd ≥ I(V ;Z|U) (51)
We establish an upper bound on the equivocation term
H(D2|Zn,Ma,M2a1,M2a2,M1b,M2b, D,M2c) in (47). By
[10, Lemma 22.1],
H(D2|Zn,Ma,M2a1,M2a2,M1b,M2b, D,M2c)
≤ n[Rd2 − I(V2;Z|U, V )] + nδ12(τ) (52)
if
Rd2 ≥ I(V2;Z|U, V ) (53)
Upon substituting (35)–(38), (39), (41), (43), (45) into (34)
and substituting (48)–(50), (52) into (47), we obtain the sum
of (34) and (47) as
I(M1;Z
n) + I(M2;Z
n)
≤ n[R1b +R1c +R2a]− n[R1b +R2b +Rd] + nI(V ;Z|U)
+ nδ1(τ)− n[R1c +Rd1] + nI(V1;Z|U, V ) + nδ2(τ)
− n[R1b +R2b +R2a1 +Rd] + nI(V ;Z|U) + nδ3(τ)
− n[R2a2 +R2c +Rd2] + nI(V2;Z|U, V ) + nδ4(τ)
+ n[R2b +Rd − I(V ;Z|U)] + nδ5(τ)
+ n[Rd1 − I(V1;Z|U, V )] + nδ6(τ)
+ n[R1b +R2b +Rd − I(V ;Z|U)] + nδ7(τ)
+ n[R2c +Rd2 − I(V2;Z|U, V )] + nδ8(τ)
+ n[R2a +R2b +R2c]− n[R1b +R2b +R2a1 +Rd]
+ nI(V ;Z|U) + nδ9(τ)− n[R2a2 +R2c +Rd2]
+ nI(V2;Z|U, V ) + nδ10(τ) + n[R1b +Rd − I(V ;Z|U)]
+ nδ11(τ) + n[Rd2 − I(V2;Z|U, V )] + nδ12(τ)
= n
12∑
i=1
δi(τ)
(g)
= 2nτn
where (g) follows by taking 2τn =
∑12
i=1 δi(τ).
Achievable rate region: In short, the individual secrecy
rate region can be obtained from the following constraints on:
• the non-negativity of rates;
• the rate relations imposed by rate splitting (14)–(17);
• the achievability conditions (27)–(33); and
• the individual secrecy conditions (40), (42), (51), (53).
Note that the conditions (44) and (46) are not included
since both are redundant.
Applying the Fourier-Motzkin procedure [10, Appendix D] to
eliminate the terms Ra, R1b, R1c, R2a, R2b, R2c , Rd, Rd1,
Rd2, Rl1 and Rl2 we obtain the individual secrecy rate region
R in Theorem 1.
APPENDIX B
In this section, we will present the converse proof of
Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2: (Converse) By Fano’s inequality
[10, p. 19], we have the reliability constraints
H(M1|Y n1 ,M2) ≤ nn, (54)
H(M2|Y n2 ) ≤ nn, (55)
where n → 0 as n→∞. From (54) and the fact that Y1 is a
degraded version of Y2, we have
H(M1|Y n2 ,M2) ≤ H(M1|Y n1 ,M2) ≤ nn (56)
and consequently
H(M1|Y n2 ,M2) ≤ nn. (57)
With this, we establish
H(M1|Y n2 ) ≤ H(M1|Y n2 ) +H(M2|Y n2 ,M1)
= H(M1,M2|Y n2 )
= H(M2|Y n2 ) +H(M1|Y n2 ,M2)
(a)
≤ nn +H(M1|Y n2 ,M2)
(b)
≤ 2nn, (58)
where (a) follows from (55) and (b) follows from (57). At
the same time, due to individual secrecy, we have the secrecy
constraints
I(M1;Z
n) ≤ nτn, (59)
I(M2;Z
n) ≤ nτn. (60)
Using (54), (55) and (57)–(60), we establish the following.
nR1 = H(M1)
= I(M1;Y
n
1 |M2) +H(M1|Y n1 ,M2)
(c)
≤ I(M1;Y n1 |M2) + nn
=
n∑
i=1
I(M1;Y1i|Y i−11 ,M2) + nn
≤
n∑
i=1
I(M1,M2, Y
i−1
1 ;Y1i) + nn
(d)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y1i) + nn
(e)
≤ nI(X;Y1) + nn
(f)
= nH(Y1) + nn
where (c) follows from (54), (d) follows from the Markov
chain (M1,M2, Y i−11 ) → Xi → Y1i, (e) follows from the
time-sharing argument and (f) follows from the fact that
H(Y1|X) = 0 since Y1 is a deterministic function of X .
Besides, we have
nR1 = H(M1)
≤ I(M1;Y n1 |M2) + nn
= I(M1;Y
n
1 |M2)− I(M1;Zn|M2) + I(M1;Zn|M2)
+ nn
≤ I(M1;Y n1 , Zn|M2)− I(M1;Zn|M2)
+ I(M1;Z
n|M2) + nn
= I(M1;Y
n
1 |Zn,M2) + I(M1;Zn|M2) + nn
=
n∑
i=1
I(M1;Y1i|Y i+11 , Zn,M2) + I(M1;Zn|M2) + nn
≤
n∑
i=1
I(M1,M2, Y
i+1
1 , Z
i−1, Zni+1;Y1i|Zi)
+ I(M1;Z
n|M2) + nn
(g)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y1i|Zi) + I(M1;Zn|M2) + nn
(h)
≤ nI(X;Y1|Z) + I(M1;Zn|M2) + nn
(i)
= nH(Y1|Z) + I(M1;Zn|M2) + nn
≤ nH(Y1|Z) + I(M1,M2;Zn) + nn
= nH(Y1|Z) + I(M1;Zn) + I(M2;Zn|M1) + nn
(j)
≤ nH(Y1|Z) + I(M2;Zn|M1) + n(n + τn)
≤ nH(Y1|Z) +H(M2|M1) + n(n + τn)
= nH(Y1|Z) + nR2 + n(n + τn)
where (g) follows from the Markov chain
(M1,M2, Y
i+1
1 , Z
i−1, Zni+1) → Xi → (Y1i, Zi), (h)
follows from the time-sharing argument, (i) follows from the
fact that H(Y1|X,Z) = 0 since Y1 is a deterministic function
of X and (j) follows from (59).
On the other hand, we have
nR1 = H(M1)
= I(M1;Y
n
2 ) +H(M1|Y n2 )
(k)
≤ I(M1;Y n2 ) + 2nn
= I(M1;Y
n
2 ) + I(M1;Z
n)− I(M1;Zn) + 2nn
(l)
≤ I(M1;Y n2 )− I(M1;Zn) + n(2n + τn)
≤ I(M1;Y n2 , Zn)− I(M1;Zn) + n(2n + τn)
= I(M1;Y
n
2 |Zn) + n(2n + τn)
=
n∑
i=1
I(M1;Y2i|Y i−12 , Zn) + n(2n + τn)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(M1, Y
i−1
2 , Z
i−1, Zni+1;Y2i|Zi) + n(2n + τn)
(m)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y2i|Zi) + n(2n + τn)
(n)
≤ nI(X;Y2|Z) + n(2n + τn)
(o)
= nH(Y2|Z) + n(2n + τn)
where (k) follows from (58), (l) follows (59), (m) follows from
the Markov chain (M1, Y i−12 , Z
i−1, Zni+1)→ Xi → (Y2i, Zi),
(n) follows from the time-sharing argument and (o) follows
from the fact that H(Y2|X) = 0 since Y2 is a deterministic
function of X .
Next, we have
nR2 = H(M2)
= I(M2;Y
n
2 ) +H(M2|Y n2 )
(p)
≤ I(M2;Y n2 ) + nn
= I(M2;Y
n
2 )− I(M2;Zn) + I(M2;Zn) + nn
(q)
≤ I(M2;Y n2 )− I(M2;Zn) + n(n + τn)
≤ I(M2;Y n2 , Zn)− I(M2;Zn) + n(n + τn)
= I(M2;Y
n
2 |Zn) + n(n + τn)
=
n∑
i=1
I(M2;Y2i|Y i−12 , Zn) + n(n + τn)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(M2, Y
i−1
2 , Z
i−1, Zni+1;Y2i|Zi) + n(n + τn)
(r)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y2i|Zi) + n(n + τn)
(s)
≤ nI(X;Y2|Z) + n(n + τn)
(t)
= nH(Y2|Z) + n(n + τn)
where (p) follows from (55), (q) follows from (60), (r) follows
from the Markov chain (M2, Y i−12 , Z
i−1, Zni+1) → Xi →
(Y2i, Zi), (s) follows from the time-sharing argument and
(t) follows from the fact that H(Y2|X) = 0 since Y2 is a
deterministic function of X .
Lastly, for the sum rate bound, we have
n(R1 +R2) = H(M1,M2)
= H(M2) +H(M1|M2)
= I(M2;Y
n
2 ) +H(M2|Y n2 ) + I(M1;Y n2 |M2)
+H(M1|Y n2 ,M2)
(u)
≤ I(M2;Y n2 ) + I(M1;Y n2 |M2) + 2nn
= I(M1,M2;Y
n
2 ) + 2nn
=
n∑
i=1
I(M1,M2;Y2i|Y i−12 ) + 2nn
≤
n∑
i=1
I(M1,M2, Y
i−1
2 ;Y2i) + 2nn
(v)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y2i) + 2nn
(w)
≤ nI(X;Y2) + 2nn
(x)
= nH(Y2) + 2nn
where (u) follows from (55) and (57), (v) follows from the
Markov chain (M1,M2, Y i−12 ) → Xi → Y2i, (w) follows
from the time-sharing argument and (x) follows from the fact
that H(Y2|X) = 0 since Y2 is a deterministic function of X .
APPENDIX C
In this section, we will present the converse proof of
Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3: (Converse) By Fano’s inequality
[10, p. 19], we have the reliability constraints (54 and (55).
From (55) and the fact that Y2 is a degraded version of Y1,
we have
H(M2|Y n1 ) ≤ H(M2|Y n2 ) ≤ nn (61)
and consequently
H(M2|Y n1 ) ≤ nn. (62)
With this, we establish
H(M1|Y n1 ) ≤ H(M1|Y n1 ) +H(M2|Y n1 ,M1)
= H(M1,M2|Y n1 )
= H(M2|Y n1 ) +H(M1|Y n1 ,M2)
(a)
≤ H(M2|Y n1 ) + nn
(b)
≤ 2nn, (63)
where (a) follows from (54) and (b) follows from (62). At
the same time, due to individual secrecy, we have the secrecy
constraints
I(M1;Z
n) ≤ nτn, (64)
I(M2;Z
n) ≤ nτn. (65)
Using (54), (55) and (62)–(65), we establish the following.
nR1 = H(M1)
= I(M1;Y
n
1 ) +H(M1|Y n1 )
(c)
≤ I(M1;Y n1 ) + 2nn
= I(M1;Y
n
1 ) + I(M1;Z
n)− I(M1;Zn) + 2nn
(d)
≤ I(M1;Y n1 )− I(M1;Zn) + n(2n + τn)
≤ I(M1;Y n1 , Zn)− I(M1;Zn) + n(2n + τn)
= I(M1;Y
n
1 |Zn) + n(2n + τn)
=
n∑
i=1
I(M1;Y1i|Y i−11 , Zn) + n(2n + τn)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(M1, Y
i−1
1 , Z
i−1, Zni+1;Y1i|Zi) + n(2n + τn)
(e)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y1i|Zi) + n(2n + τn)
(f)
≤ nI(X;Y1|Z) + n(2n + τn)
(g)
= nH(Y1|Z) + n(2n + τn)
where (c) follows from (63), (d) follows (64), (e) follows from
the Markov chain (M1, Y i−11 , Z
i−1, Zni+1)→ Xi → (Y1i, Zi),
(f) follows from the time-sharing argument and (g) follows
from the fact that H(Y1|X) = 0 since Y1 is a deterministic
function of X .
Next, we have
nR2 = H(M2)
= I(M2;Y
n
2 ) +H(M2|Y n2 )
(h)
≤ I(M2;Y n2 ) + nn
= I(M2;Y
n
2 )− I(M2;Zn) + I(M2;Zn) + nn
(i)
≤ I(M2;Y n2 )− I(M2;Zn) + n(n + τn)
≤ I(M2;Y n2 , Zn)− I(M2;Zn) + n(n + τn)
= I(M2;Y
n
2 |Zn) + n(n + τn)
=
n∑
i=1
I(M2;Y2i|Y i−12 , Zn) + n(n + τn)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(M2, Y
i−1
2 , Z
i−1, Zni+1;Y2i|Zi) + n(n + τn)
(j)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y2i|Zi) + n(n + τn)
(k)
≤ nI(X;Y2|Z) + n(n + τn)
(l)
= nH(Y2|Z) + n(n + τn)
where (h) follows from (55), (i) follows from (65), (j) follows
from the Markov chain (M2, Y i−12 , Z
i−1, Zni+1) → Xi →
(Y2i, Zi), (k) follows from the time-sharing argument and
(l) follows from the fact that H(Y2|X) = 0 since Y2 is a
deterministic function of X .
Lastly, for the sum rate bound, we have
n(R1 +R2) = H(M1,M2)
= H(M2) +H(M1|M2)
= I(M2;Y
n
1 ) +H(M2|Y n1 ) + I(M1;Y n1 |M2)
+H(M1|Y n1 ,M2)
(m)
≤ I(M2;Y n1 ) + I(M1;Y n1 |M2) + 2nn
= I(M1,M2;Y
n
1 ) + 2nn
=
n∑
i=1
I(M1,M2;Y1i|Y i−11 ) + 2nn
≤
n∑
i=1
I(M1,M2, Y
i−1
1 ;Y1i) + 2nn
(n)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y1i) + 2nn
(o)
≤ nI(X;Y1) + 2nn
(p)
= nH(Y1) + 2nn
where (m) follows from (54) and (62), (n) follows from the
Markov chain (M1,M2, Y i−11 )→ Xi → Y1i, (o) follows from
the time-sharing argument and (p) follows from the fact that
H(Y1|X) = 0 since Y1 is a deterministic function of X .
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